Overview of designĪll participants completed either an RWA or LWA scale, measurements of support for each of the two primary candidates in the election in question (2008 or 2016), an ideology measure, and relevant demographic variables. Would we expect LWA to predict support for left-wing candidates during elections in the same way that RWA predicted support for Trump in the 2016 election? To the degree that authoritarianism on the left is, like authoritarianism on the right, a response to threat (e.g., Choma & Hanoch, 2017 Crawford, 2017 Duckitt et al., 2010 Feldman, 2003 Jost et al., 2003), we might expect differences in effect sizes for RWA and LWA depending on the level of perceived threat to their associated ideology. Whereas some have expressed skepticism about left-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996 Jost et al., 2003 Stone, 1980), others have argued that left-wing authoritarianism is a valid construct (e.g., Malka, Lelkes, & Holzer, 2017 McFarland, Ageyev, & Djintcharadze, 1996 Right-wing authoritarianism and left-wing authoritarianism in elections The concept of left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) – the idea that liberalism may be subject to the same reliance on simple authority and psychological rigidity as conservatism – has a controversial history in psychology. Keywords: William Popkin, Leslie Paul Thiel, Kant, Critique of Judgment, Practical Reasoning, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Chaim Perelman, Richard Posner, Hively v.Section snippets Left-Wing authoritarianism By attending to how we judge well, we can best preserve the fragile structures that subtend the operation of our legal system and engender hope that the quest for justice, however, imperfect and halting, can continue. It is something that we do and see every day. Judging well is not a mysterious or rare event. The multiple opinions provide competing conceptions of judging well, and I assess them in light of my theory. Ivy Tech Community College, the Seventh Circuit case that held that discriminating against LGBT employees is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. I defend my account by assessing the opinions in Hively v. Judgment is real and constrained, even if it is neither deductive nor rationally defensible as an objective fact. Law judges exhibit this fundamental activity in a disciplined manner. We cultivate rhetorical knowledge through interpretive experiences that provide us with dynamic resources to exercise judgment in changing circumstances. I conclude that judgment is a foundational capacity deeply rooted in the structure of our brain and intrinsic to our sense of self. Leslie Paul Thiel brings contemporary work in neuroscience to bear on what I term “rhetorical knowledge.” I develop his conception of “ordinary judgment” along different lines, arguing for a conception of “judging well” that is rooted in practical reasoning as articulated rhetorically. Drawing on Kantian aesthetics, Popkin defends the ability to assess non-deductive judgments. First, I briefly review Professor William Popkin’s admirable work as a starting point for analysis. Rather than seeking an elusive objective standard by which to measure the correctness of “a judgment,” I argue that we need to develop a vocabulary to assess whether judges are “judging well,” because the activity of judging well serves as the cornerstone of the rule of law. The question, as phrased, is both vitally important and unanswerable on its own terms. Can judges interpret the law in a manner that is objectively verifiable, or do judges necessarily – even if unconsciously – inject their own predispositions and biases into their decisions? It is difficult to decide whether such a question is frivolous in the post-Realist age, or whether it is the is the single most important question that we can ask about our legal system.
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